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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF
NOTICE UNDER RULE 23(c)(2)
The respective due process clauses of the 5thi and 14th 2 amendments
guarantee fair procedures to all litigants in our courts. Class actions, by defini-
tion, create several due process problems. A class action is an action brought by
an individual on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated. 3 It
is a representative action where the rights of thousands of people may be de-
termined by the suit of one or more individuals from the class. 4 To meet the
requirements of due process the rights of the absent parties must be protected
along with the rights of the litigants before the court.
While a manuscript was being prepared on this topic and the related
topic of the statutory notice requirement of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review published a
student comments on these topics closely resembling our manuscript and ren-
dering it repetitive. However, an exhaustive symposium on Rule 23 requires
a section on the constitutional and statutory notice requirements of the Rule.
Accordingly, the following is a digest of the relevant sections of the Pennsyl-
vania article. Points of disagreement are indicated in footnotes.
The Advisory Committee's° Notes to Rule 23 cite two Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the due process requirements for binding absent mem-
bers of a class,? Hansberry v. Lees and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.s In Hansberry, a suit was brought to enjoin the breach of a re-
strictive covenant. The defendants claimed that the covenant had never
become effective since it had not been signed by the requisite number of
property owners. Although the defendants could prove their assertion, the
Illinois court granted the injunction 10 because it had been stipulated in an
earlier class action that the requisite number of property owners had signed
1 U.S. Const. amend. V.
2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Black's Law Dictionary 315 (4th ed. 1968).
The due process requirements of the Constitution are equally applicable to alI types
of class actions. However, stricter standards may be established by Rule 23 with regard
to particular types of class actions.
4 Binding absent members does not appear to present a constitutional problem so
Iong as their interests are protected. As Judge Frankel pointed out in commenting on
Rule 23, "It is not really unprecedented . . . to conclude in one fair proceeding the
interests of people who do not participate in person or by counsel." Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1967). For example,
in addition to class actions, absent parties are bound by in rem proceedings, statutes of
limitations, the doctrine of Iaches, and the doctrine of stare decisis.
5 Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 889 (1968).
6 The Advisory Committee drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sub-
mitted them to the Supreme Court for approval. The Notes of the Advisory Committee
help to explain the meaning and intended application of the Rules.
7 39 F.R.D. 98,406-07 (1966).
8 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
° 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
10 Lee v. Hansberry, 372 III. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939).
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the covenant.' 1
 The court considered the present defendants bound by the
earlier class action even though the finding in the earlier action was er-
roneous. Only by a direct attack on the prior judgment could the findings of
the court be set aside."
The United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
interests of the representatives in the first case were not the same as the
interests of the defendants in the present action and, hence, that the present
defendants were deprived of due process in the first action. In considering the
requirements of due process the Court never mentioned a requirement of
notice. Rather, it was concerned with the identity of interests of the representa-
tives and the rest of the class and with the basic fairness of the representa-
tive's actions." A fundamentally fair proceeding that protected the absent
parties was all that the Supreme Court required. While the Advisory Com-
mittee cited Hansberry for the proposition that notice must be given in ac-
tions brought under subdivision (b) (3), it is not clear that such notice is
required by the opinion.
Mullane is cited also for the proposition that notice must be given in a
(b) (3) action.'4 In Mullane, the plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the
notice required under a New York banking statute. 16
 The statute allowed
banks to commingle the assets of several trust funds into a single investment
trust. An accounting had to be submitted for court approval three times a
year.' 6
 At these accountings the statute required the presence of separate
attorneys to represent the people interested in the income of the fund and
those interested in the principal. 17
 If the court approved the accounting,
all claims against the trustee for improper management during the term of
the accounting were terminated. 18
 The statute required notice by publication
in a court-selected newspaper once a week for the four weeks preceding the
accounting. The notice had to include only the name of the bank, the date of
the fund's inception and a list of all participating trusts, estates or funds."
A list of the interested persons was not required. This minimal notice was
the provision of the statute attacked in Mullane.
The interests of the attorneys serving as guardians ad litem in Mullane
were quite different from the interests of the representatives in a class action.
The guardian ad litem acts without the advice or assistance of any client.
His fee is court-established and not predicated on success. Thus, his main
concern may become the quick and perfunctory performance of his court-
assigned duties. On the contrary, in a class action, where the attorney is paid
on a contingent fee basis, the interests of the attorney and the interests of
11 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 III. App. 519 (1934).
12 372 III. at 373, 24 N.E.2d at 39.
13 311 U.S. at 43.
14 39 F.R.D. at 107.
15 N.Y. Bank. Law § 100-c (McKinney 1950).
16 Id
. § 100-c(10).
17 Id. § 100-C(11).
18 339 U.S. at 311.
13 N.Y. Bank. Law § 100-c(9) (McKinney 1950).
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the absentees are identical. If the class prevails the attorney collects his fee;
if the class loses the attorney goes uncompensated2°
This divergence of interests in the guardian ad litent procedure may
have persuaded the Court in Mullane to ensure that some of the beneficiaries
received actual notice of the proceedings. The Court required that mailed
notice be sent to those beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known
and with whom the bank regularly communicated." The Advisory Committee
interpreted this holding to require individual notice to all absent members
of a class who could be identified through reasonable effort.
The facts of Mullane neither compel nor suggest such an interpretation.
In Mullane, the Court was faced with a case where the following factors were
present: (1 ) a possible conflict of interest; (2) a small number of benefi-
ciaries; (3) an existing mailing list; and (4) notice published in the back
pages of a newspaper. These factors are not present in the typical class action.
Of greater relevance to the class action situation is the Court's treatment
of the notice required to be directed to unknown and conjectural beneficiaries.
Here the statutory standard of notice by publication was sanctioned even
though the Court recognized that such notice was likely to be ineffective2 2
The Court balanced the expense required to discover the names and ad-
dresses of the unknown absentees against the character of the proceedings
and the nature of the interests involved 2 3 It concluded that the burdens of
notifying unknown absentees would outweigh the benefits of the common
trust fund device. 24
In addition to these practical considerations the Court recognized that
personal notice to those on the mailing list would in effect turn the guardian
ad litem procedure into a representative action. 25 The interests of the notified
beneficiaries would be identical with the interests of the absentees. 2° An
identity of interests would insure the adequate protection of the interests of
the absent beneficiaries. The Court stated that " [n] otice reasonably certain
to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the inter-
ests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all."'"
It is therefore difficult to accept as correct the Advisory Committee's
interpretation of Mullane as requiring individual notice in a class action
suit. On the contrary, the language in Mullane tends to indicate that notice
need not be sent to absent class members so long as their representatives
adequately protect their interests. Thus, there does not seem to be a con-
stitutional requirement of individual notice in class actions. 28
2° See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
21 339 U.S. at 318.
22 Id. at 317.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 318.
25 Id. at 319.
2° Id.
27 Id.
28 Interpreting Mullane to require no notice in a class action seems to ignore the
result reached in that case. Mailed notice was required as to those beneficiaries who
were known; publication was required as to those who were unknown. Thus, some form
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While due process may not require any notice to absentees in a class
action, the statutory requirements of Rule 23 must be complied with. Sub-
division (c) (2) states that "[I.] n any class action maintained under subdi-
vision (b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." 23
This subdivision could prove to be the greatest impediment to the
prosecution of class actions. The interpretation of this section is left largely
in the hands of the trial judge, since the Advisory Committee's Notes are not
very illuminating.30
 It will fall upon the trial judge to decide "the best notice
practicable" and how great an effort need be made to identify individual
members of the class. While the notice need not meet the rigorous procedures
for service of process," some minimal notice is essential. Subdivision (c) (2)
appears to strike a balance between a desire to inform class members and the
expense and effort needed to notify them individually.
While one would expect a balancing test to be applied in order to deter-
mine the required notice under subdivision (c) (2), the first court to consider
this problem did not apply such a test. In Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin,32
individual notice was considered mandatory under (c) (2) despite the pres-
ence of competing interests. In Eisen, an action was brought on behalf of
all the odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange during a six-year
period. Estimates of the size of the class ranged from hundreds of thousands
to 3,750,000.33 Requiring individual notice to all the members would be so
costly, both in terms of investigation and mailing costs, that a class suit would
be prohibitively expensive.
However, Judge Tyler refused to allow notice by publication on the
grounds that both Rule 23 and due process required individual notice to all
members who could be identified. Ignoring the statutory language of "best
notice practicable" and "reasonable effort" the court held that the action
could not be maintained because of the inherent financial limitations pre-
sented.34 The implication of the Eisen decision is that class actions may be
of notice was required to be directed to all beneficiaries. It cannot be said that the court
would have upheld a statute that required mailed notice to known beneficiaries, while it
completely ignored those who were unknown.
Under Mullane, it seems that some form of notice is constitutionally required in all
class action cases. The particular form of notice will have to be determined on a case-
by-case basis with the prime factors for consideration being the cohesiveness of the
class, the adequacy of the representation, and the practical consequences of requiring
individual notice. As the cohesiveness of the class and the adequacy of the representation
increase, the need for individual notice will decrease. Similarly, as the cost of individual
notice increases to the point where it will make the use of the class action suit financially
impossible, other methods of notification will become more attractive.
This type of approach was adopted by the Advisory Committee in its Notes to
subdivision (d) (2), the section dealing with discretionary notice. 39 F.R.D. at 106-07.
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
3 f0 See 39 F.R.D. at 104-05.
31 Id. at 107.
32 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir
1968).
33 Id. at 151.
34 Id. at 151-52.
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foreclosed in cases where there are large numbers of small claimants since the
representatives will probably not be able to afford the cost of notifying absent
members.
This result would be particularly disturbing since this type of large class
is most likely to be spawned by a violation of either the federal securities
laws or the federal antitrust laws. In both these areas there has been a deter-
mination by Congress that private enforcement of these statutes is vital to
the general scheme of enforcement enacted.' Yet, the class action device may
be the only way that private enforcement can be effectuated when the injured
parties are numerous and each claim is monetarily small. Thus, to deprive
the small claimant of the use of the class action may be to defeat a vital part
of the enforcement provisions of the securities and antitrust laws.
The court in Eisen seemed to be more concerned with the requirements
of due process and hence attributed less importance to the language of sub-
division (c) (2).3° As has been noted, the Supreme Court has not required
individual notice in all cases in order to assure due process. The due process
standard is one of flexibility and under Mullane it is quite possible that
publication would be sanctioned in an Eisen-type case.
In any event, the financial ability to send out mailed notice should not
be a condition precedent to maintaining a class action if all the other stan-
dards of Rule 23 are met. As was pointed out in Dolgow v. Anderson, "[I]t
would be anomalous to say that . . . litigation may proceed as a class action
and then lay down a condition which could never be met." 37 Courts should
interpret (c) (2) so that the best notice possible within the bounds of reason-
able effort is ordered. Individual notice should be required only when it would
not preclude the maintenance of the action. In cases involving large numbers
of small claimants something short of personal notice is the "best notice
practicable."3°
The alternative to individual notice is not necessarily notice by publica-
tion. In addition to individual notice and notice by publication the court
might order individual notice to those members appearing on an existing
mailing list, individual notice to a random sample of absent members, indi-
vidual notice to those members whose financial stake in the outcome of the
case exceeds a certain limit, or a combination of the above.
At the same time, the financial burden of sending the notice may be
shifted away from the plaintiff. While it has been generally assumed that the
83 Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k)-(1) (1964); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 i(e), p(b), r (1964) ; Clayton Act
g§ 4-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-16 (1964).
32 See 41 F.R.D. at 151.
27 43 F.R.D. at 500.
38
 Combining this interpretation of the notice required under (c) (2) with the
constitutional notice requirements of due process (see note 28, supra), it appears that there
is only one notice requirement for all class actions. Both (c) (2) and due process require
some notice. Both indicate a preference for individual notice. Yet, both allow notice by
publication if individual notice is not practicable. Thus, the courts must make the same
pragmatic analysis to resolve both the notice requirements of due process and the notice
requirements of (c) (2).
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plaintiff should bear the expense of the notice," this result is not required
by the statute. Section (c) (2) says that "the court shall direct . . . notice" 40
and it has been suggested that the court's postal mailing privilege be used
to defray this expense:" It has also been suggested that a corporate defendant
may be required to finance the notice in certain cases on the basis of (1) its
fiduciary duty to its present stockholders; (2) its interest in having everyone
bound by the decree; and (3) its ability to bear the expense: 12
The selection of a particular form of notice should depend on an analy-
sis of the particular facts of the case. Among the relevant factors to be con-
sidered are (1) a comparison of the cost of any particular form of notice
with the total damages sought; (2) whether any members of the class have
an especially large stake in the outcome of the case; (3) the likelihood of
many members who will want to opt out; and (4) whether the suit will ever
be brought if not allowed to proceed as a class action. Upon analysis.of these
factors the court can tailor the notice required to the needs of the particular
case.
This analytical process can be illustrated by reference to the type of
class action brought in Eisen. The class is composed of many members, each of
whom has a small claim. It is, therefore, unlikely that many members will
want to be excluded from the class and also unlikely that the suit will be
brought unless the class action device is employed. In such a situation notice
by publication would seem appropriate, with the court specifying national
media such as the Wall Street Journal or New York Times.
The only alternative to this balancing test is a strict construction of the
notice requirement of (c) (2). Such a construction would deny the class action
device to many worthy litigants. It is submitted that such a denial of the use
of the class action would constitute a greater injustice, to both class members
and the public interest, than would the denial of notice to some absentees.
Since neither the constitutional requirements of due process nor the
statutory requirements of Rule 23, subdivision (c) ( 2), demand individual no-
tice to absentees, all that seems to be required for a smoothly functioning
class action rule is enlightened interpretation by the courts.
WILLIAM H. BLUTH
39 See, Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Fischer v.
Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
41 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
12 Id. at 498-500.
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